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Abstract 
 This paper explores the impact that systems of judicial elections have on judges’ 
decision making. I argue that elections force judicial candidates to depend on private 
campaign contributions in order to be elected, and that lawyers and law firms who 
frequently appear in court have the greatest incentive to contribute to judicial campaigns. 
Therefore, I contend that judicial elections create a system where campaign contributions 
could generate biases in judges’ behavior in favor of the parties that contributed to their 
campaigns. I expect that there will be a significant and positive relationship between 
lawyers’ campaign contributions and judges’ decisions in the years following their 
elections. To test this theory, I compiled a dataset that compares the campaign 
contributors of the four North Carolina Supreme Court judges who were elected in 2006 
with the lawyers and firms that argued cases before them in 2007 and 2008. I then 
conducted an empirical analysis of the impact of contributions on judicial decisions. The 
results of this analysis suggest that there is a significant and positive relationship between 
lawyers’ campaign contributions and judges’ decision making. I also analyzed the 
relationship between contributions and decisions in the context of the state’s public 
financing program, where judicial candidates could receive a portion of their campaign 
funds from the state. The results suggest that participating in the public financing 
program did not eliminate the influence of private contributions on judges’ votes. 
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Introduction 
In recent years, many prominent figures in the legal community have advocated 
against systems of judicial elections due to the possibility that financial contributions to 
judges’ election campaigns will hinder their ability to issue impartial rulings once 
elected. The American Bar Association issued a report stating, “while there are many 
threats to judicial independence, one of the more pervasive problems is the nature and 
cost of running for the bench” (American Bar Association 2002). Don Willet, a justice on 
the Texas Supreme Court, also acknowledged the belief that “donations drive decisions,” 
and claimed that judicial elections are “toxic to the idea of an impartial, independent 
judiciary” (Cohen 2013). Even retired U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor 
has led efforts to abolish judicial elections and encouraged states to instead select judges 
through merit based systems (Schwartz 2009). These criticisms highlight the growing 
concerns that judicial elections inherently limit judges’ ability to make decisions 
independently and impartially.  
 Despite the criticisms of judicial elections, it remains unclear whether they are 
actually a valuable method for selecting state judges. On one hand, elections can be 
thought to increase the accountability of public officials and allow the electorate to have a 
more direct voice in the selection of its judges. However, judicial elections can also be 
problematic as they encourage candidates to solicit substantial contributions in order to 
fund their election campaigns. These contributions are frequently provided by parties that 
have an interest in the outcomes of cases and are frequent actors in court, such as lawyers 
and large businesses (Goldberg, Holman, and Sanchez 2002). This creates the possibility 
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that judges, who are supposed to decide cases independently from outside influences, will 
display a bias in favor of the parties that contributed to their campaigns. 
Currently, 22 states use some variation of judicial elections to select their judges 
(American Bar Association). If there is a possibility that judicial elections prevent judges 
from issuing impartial rulings, it is important to research this topic and its implications in 
order to ensure the integrity of nearly half of the states’ judicial systems. Although there 
is a large body of literature that has already explored the topic of judicial elections, much 
of the existing research has been conducted within a small number of states that have 
notoriously competitive elections and strongly ideologically divided courts. As a result, 
there is a need for further examination of judicial elections in additional states in order to 
reach a more satisfying conclusion about whether judicial elections inherently create 
biases in judicial behavior. Additionally, some states have experimented with programs 
that provide public financing for judicial elections in order to reduce judges’ dependence 
on private donations and eliminate the probability of resulting biases. The impact of 
public financing programs has not been widely explored in the existing literature, and 
their implications for judicial elections merit further research as well. 
 In this study, I examine the relationship between election campaign contributions 
and judges’ rulings within the context of the Supreme Court of North Carolina. In the 
following sections, I will first review the existing literature on judicial elections and 
examine the methods used in previous research to demonstrate a relationship between 
campaign contributions and judicial decisions. Next, I will explain the causal mechanism 
that would enable systems of judicial elections to create biases in judges’ rulings on the 
individual cases argued before them. Then, I will show how this theoretical argument can 
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be operationalized in North Carolina and present the results from my empirical analysis. 
Finally, I will discuss the implications of these results for systems of judicial elections 
and propose options for further research to supplement these findings. 
 
Literature Review 
 There has been significant research performed on the subject of judicial elections 
in recent years, but there remains a need for additional research. While many studies have 
explored the relationship between campaign contributions and judicial decisions 
specifically, the majority of these studies have focused on individual states with highly 
competitive elections and strongly ideologically divided courts. As a result, there is a gap 
in the literature and a need for further exploration of judicial elections in a greater 
number of states and under a wider variety of political environments. In the following 
literature review, I summarize the methodologies and findings of previous studies in 
order to demonstrate how my research will expand upon these studies and provide a more 
comprehensive understanding of judicial elections. 
The existing literature largely supports the idea that judicial elections create a 
system where biases in judges’ decision making could occur. First, judicial elections tend 
to have lower citizen participation rates and a less informed electorate than those in 
elections for other public figures. The lack of information regarding judicial candidates 
often leads voters to select judges arbitrarily, based largely on factors such as name 
recognition, incumbency, ethnicity, and gender, as opposed to more merit based factors 
such as legal experience or qualification (Lovrich and Sheldon 1984). In elections where 
constituents know little about the candidates, increasing a candidate’s name recognition 
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through tactics as simple as increasing the number of signs stating the candidate’s name 
in the community has been shown to significantly increase their electoral support (Kam 
and Zechmeister 2013). As a result, these findings suggest that because of the lack of 
public interest and informed voters in judicial elections, candidates can significantly 
increase their possibility of being elected merely by increasing their advertising efforts 
and making voters more aware of their name. 
Because name recognition and advertising are crucial components in judicial 
elections, large-scale advertising campaigns have come to play a substantial role in 
elections as well. In 2008, candidates in nearly 75 percent of state supreme court 
elections utilized television advertising as part of their campaigns (Hall 2015). However, 
these types of major advertising campaigns are also expensive. As can be expected with 
the increase in advertising efforts, the average cost of judges’ election campaigns has 
substantially increased in recent years (Bonneau and Hall 2009). These findings 
demonstrate that extensive advertising campaigns are becoming a central feature of 
modern judicial elections, and suggest there is a need for significant campaign 
contributions in order to fund them. As a result, it can be assumed that candidates must to 
some extent rely on campaign contributors in order to fund a successful campaign. 
 Knowing the importance of campaign contributions in judicial elections, it is 
important to next examine the sources of judges’ campaign funds. Multiple studies have 
found lawyers to be substantial contributors in state supreme court campaigns, in many 
cases contributing more than 30 percent of candidates’ donations (Goldberg, Holman, 
and Sanchez 2002; McCall 2003). Furthermore, the lawyers that contribute to judges’ 
election campaigns often end up appearing before them in court after they are elected 
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(McCall 2003). These findings suggest that judicial elections create a framework within 
which judicial biases could exist, as allowing judges to decide cases involving their past 
campaign contributors provides an opportunity for them to show favoritism towards their 
contributors and reward them for their financial support. 
 In order to empirically test whether judicial elections actually lead to biases in 
judges’ behaviors, multiple researchers have examined whether a statistical relationship 
exists between campaign contributions and judicial decisions. Ware (1999) found that 
there was a significant correlation between judges’ votes and the interests of their 
campaign contributors in the Supreme Court of Alabama. Waltenburg and Lopeman 
(2000) similarly found that there was a correlation between campaign contributions and 
judges’ decisions in the Alabama, Kentucky, and Ohio supreme courts. However, as 
Cann (2007) points out in his critique of past research, these studies do not establish that 
a causal relationship exists between contributions and decisions merely by showing that 
the two are correlated. In fact, one of the central arguments against their methodology is 
that the causal direction between contributions and decisions could run in the opposite 
direction. Parties who believe a certain judge would be more inclined to vote in their 
favor, such as a large business and an ideologically conservative judge, would be likely to 
contribute to that judge’s campaign to increase his or her probability of being elected. If 
the judge ruled in favor of the contributor once elected, it may not be an attempt to 
reward them for their campaign contribution but a result of the judge’s natural ideological 
leaning that motivated the original contribution. As a result, these studies suggest that 
establishing a correlation between contributions and decisions may only show that 
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contributors tend to support judges who are inherently more likely to rule in their favor, 
not prove that judicial elections encourage biased judicial behaviors. 
There have been a variety of attempts to expand upon this methodology and better 
establish a causal relationship between contributions and decisions in the literature as 
well. McCall (2003) attempted to show that a causal relationship exists by studying only 
the ideologically conservative judges on the Texas Civil Supreme Court. She found that 
judges were significantly more likely to stray from their ideology and issue liberal rulings 
when the lawyer representing the more liberal side of the case had contributed to the 
judges’ election campaigns. By looking exclusively at cases where judges ruled against 
their typical ideologies, the study increases the likelihood that the judges’ decisions were 
actually caused by lawyers’ donations instead of the judges’ natural leanings towards the 
same ideologies as their contributors. However, this methodology is not easily replicable 
in other states where supreme court judges lack such consistent and distinct ideologies 
and voting tendencies. As a result, while this study provides useful insight about judicial 
elections and supports the idea that elections generate judicial biases, its methodology 
cannot be easily replicated in additional states. 
 Other studies also attempted to establish a relationship between campaign 
contributions and judicial decisions by controlling for judges’ ideologies. Cann (2007) 
examined the relationship between campaign contributions and judges’ rulings in the 
Supreme Court of Georgia. In order to demonstrate that the relationship between the 
contributions and decisions was causal, Cann classified judges’ votes in each case as 
either liberal or conservative and then used a party-adjusted ideology score (PAJID) to 
measure each judge’s general ideological leaning. By using a PAJID score to control for 
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judges’ ideology, Cann’s methodology reduces the probability that judges ruled in favor 
of their contributors for reasons other than rewarding them for their financial support. 
Cann found that campaign contributions were correlated with judges’ decisions even after 
controlling for ideology, which supports the theory that judicial elections encourage 
favoritism on the bench. However, because the study only examined the implications of 
judicial elections in one state, conducting a similar analysis in additional states and 
political environments would be a beneficial addition to his research. Additionally, 
Cann’s methodology of classifying rulings in individual cases as either liberal or 
conservative can be subjective and creates a possibility for error. As a result, controlling 
for ideology using a more objective methodology would also be an important 
contribution to the literature. 
 An alterative to examining the relationship between contributions and decisions 
by directly controlling for judges’ ideology can be observed in Songer and Sheehan’s 
research (1992). The authors classified litigants in federal appellate court cases on a scale 
from one to four based on how relatively advantaged or disadvantaged the parties were 
likely to be in court. Advantaged parties or “upperdogs” were assumed to be those with a 
greater probability of winning their cases due to factors like being repeat players in court 
and having access to better litigation resources than the “underdogs” or relatively less 
advantaged parties. They classified litigants into one of four parties ranging from least 
advantaged to most advantaged: individual litigants, businesses, state and local 
governments, and the US government. The authors found that parties on the more 
advantaged end of the scale were much more likely to win their appeals than parties on 
the lower end, with the federal government winning 58.2 percent of appeals and 
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individuals winning only 12.5 percent. Their findings suggests that certain types of 
litigants can be considered relatively advantaged and more likely to receive favorable 
decisions from judges, so these relative advantages should be controlled for when 
studying the relationship between judicial decisions and campaign contributions as well. 
By incorporating Songer and Sheehan’s methodology into a study of judicial elections, it 
is possible to control for the possibility that lawyers who are able to provide financial 
contributions to judges’ campaigns represent parties who have better financial and 
litigation resources that provide them with inherent advantages in court. Controlling for 
these advantages increases the probability that lawyers’ financial contributions are 
motivating judges to rule in their favor, not the litigants’ advantages over the other party. 
Songer and Sheehan’s underdog methodology can also be used as a proxy to 
control for judges’ ideologies. The authors acknowledge that judges may have inherent 
biases towards stronger or weaker litigants. For example, they suggest that judges who 
can be considered ideologically liberal could be likely to exhibit a “pro-underdog bias” 
and lean towards protecting the rights of parties that typically lack advantages in court 
such as individuals and criminal defendants. On the other side, judges with conservative 
ideologies could be expected to support the more advantaged upperdogs such as big 
businesses and the government. There are many nuances to using litigants’ relative 
advantages as a proxy for ideology because the advantages of litigants vary across 
individual cases within these classifications, so it is not possible to claim that one 
category of litigants will always be more advantaged than another. However, this method 
provides a mechanism for approximating ideology without having to subjectively classify 
rulings or ideologies as liberal or conservative. As a result, Songer and Sheehan’s 
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research offers a different approach to control for both litigants’ natural advantages and 
judges’ ideologies in order to further establish a causal relationship between campaign 
contributions and judges’ behavior.  
 Although the majority of the literature appears to reveal that judicial elections 
lead to biases in judicial behavior, other studies fail to find a relationship between 
contributions and decisions. Cann, Bonneau, and Boyea (2012) studied judicial elections 
in Michigan, Nevada, and Texas. After controlling for judges’ ideology, they found a 
significant relationship between campaign contributions and judges’ decisions in 
Michigan but not in Nevada or Texas. This suggests that judicial elections are not 
inherently harmful, as judicial elections do not generate biases in at least some 
environments. Their findings merit further research on judicial elections within additional 
states in order to provide a more complete understanding of the types of environments 
and electoral systems that encourage judicial elections to have harmful implications on 
judges’ impartiality.  
 There is also a need for further research on the effects that state regulations and 
financing reforms have on judicial elections and biased decision making. Public financing 
programs for judicial campaigns can be considered beneficial because they allow 
candidates to use more resources to convince the electorate why they should be elected 
instead of devoting their resources towards fundraising efforts (Goldberg et al 2004). 
However, it is also possible that financing programs could decrease the effectiveness of 
judicial elections by limiting candidates’ nominal amount of campaign expenditures. 
Bonneau (2007) found that candidates who were challenging incumbent judges received 
the greatest electoral benefits from higher amounts of campaign expenditures because 
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they allowed the challengers to acquire the name recognition that they lacked. As a result, 
regulations that cap campaign expenditures or limit expenditures to publicly provided 
funds could limit challengers’ ability to effectively campaign and therefore increase the 
incumbency advantage. Because there is not a general consensus on the effectiveness of 
campaign financing reforms and their implications have not been widely examined in the 
literature, further examination of these programs would be beneficial as well. 
 Overall, the existing literature suggests that systems of judicial elections create an 
opportunity for biased judicial behavior and demonstrates that in many cases these biases 
actually occur. However, there is also a lack of evidence that a relationship exists 
between campaign contributions and judges’ decisions in some states. My research will 
provide a better understanding of these inconsistencies and the implications of judicial 
elections by studying their effects in North Carolina, a state that has been largely left out 
of the existing research. By expanding upon the scope of the existing literature, this study 
will help explain whether judicial elections inherently encourage biased judicial decisions 
or whether certain circumstances and political environments make them more likely to 
occur. Additionally, I will study elections under North Carolina’s public financing 
program in order to further the research regarding the effectiveness of campaign 
financing reform efforts.  
 
Theory 
There are multiple methods that states can use to select their judges. One selection 
process is judicial appointment, where a state’s legislature or governor independently 
chooses its judges. As this paper highlights, the electorate can also choose the state’s 
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judges through judicial elections that are either partisan or nonpartisan. Another type of 
selection process is merit selection, where a nominating committee selects a pool of 
judicial candidates based on their qualifications and the governor appoints judges from 
this group of candidates. Many merit selection systems also include retention elections, 
where the electorate has the opportunity to decide whether judges should remain on the 
bench after they have served for a period of time (American Bar Association 2008). 
The debate over which method of selection is optimal largely centers around 
judicial independence. Judicial independence is the idea that judges should be able to 
make legal decisions without the influence of the other branches of government or any 
factors unrelated to the specific cases. Charles Geyh summarizes methods of judicial 
selection as a struggle to “ensure that justices are independent enough to follow the facts 
and law without fear or favor, but not so independent as to disregard the facts or law to 
the detriment of the rule of law and public confidence in the court” (2008: 87). Each of 
the possible systems of selecting judges creates some type of threat to judges’ ability to 
decide cases impartially, and the existing research is still undecided as to which option is 
the most optimal for maintaining judicial independence. 
Judicial elections were originally thought to be a type of selection that would 
increase judicial independence. They were first established as a reform of judicial 
appointment systems, which were perceived as encouraging political cronyism and 
preventing judges from making impartial decisions regarding the legislative and 
executive branches (K. Hall 2005). Because the legislature or the governor has complete 
control over judicial selection under appointment systems, it is possible that they would 
select judges who they know would issue rulings favorable to their own interests as a 
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reward for appointing them to the bench. As a result, elections were considered a better 
alternative because they decreased judges’ dependence on other branches of government 
in order to obtain office.  
However, judicial elections also pose a threat to judicial independence. Because 
the electorate is widely uninformed in judicial elections, candidates must rely largely on 
name recognition in order to be elected (Lovrich and Sheldon 1984; Kam and 
Zechmeister 2013). As explained in the previous section, this creates a need for large-
scale advertising campaigns and has encouraged a multitude of judicial candidates to 
utilize expensive advertising strategies such as television advertisements (Hall 2015). As 
some candidates begin to use these farther reaching and more expensive advertising 
methods in their election campaigns, it is likely that others will feel pressured to employ 
similar methods in order to maintain name recognition and remain competitive. The 
growing importance of extensive election campaigns and the necessity of large 
contributions in order to fund them are likely to make candidates dependent upon 
campaign contributors in order to achieve election. As a result, it is theoretically possible 
that judicial elections do not increase judges’ independence relative to appointment 
systems, but merely shift judges’ dependence from other government branches to their 
campaign contributors.  
Systems of judicial elections ultimately create a potential for favoritism and 
biased judicial behavior when parties with a stake in future court cases donate to the 
campaigns of judges who will later decide their cases. State level court cases often do not 
have major implications for individuals outside of the parties involved in the case, so the 
majority of the population is unlikely to have a significant interest in the state’s judicial 
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elections. Lawyers and law firms who frequently appear in front of the court are one of 
the parties most likely to be affected by and interested in the outcome of judicial 
elections, as their livelihood will be directly impacted by the judges who are elected. As a 
result, lawyers and firms will have the greatest incentive to contribute to judges’ election 
campaigns, possibly because they desire to increase the likelihood that a judge will be 
elected who is ideologically more likely to rule in favor of the types of litigants they 
represent. However, it is also possible that lawyers and firms are driven to contribute by 
an expectation that supporting judges’ campaigns will encourage the judge to show 
favoritism towards them and their clients, or that failing to contribute will lead to a bias 
against them. Because judicial elections at least create an opportunity for judges to 
exhibit favorable behavior towards their contributors, it is possible that lawyers and firms 
are driven to donate because they expect to be rewarded for their support. 
Even if judicial elections did cause judges to vote in favor of their contributors, it 
is unclear whether these biases would be intentional. Judges could consciously decide to 
show favoritism towards their contributors in an attempt to reward those who helped 
them achieve election, or, more cynically, they could even have explicitly agreed to trade 
legal decisions for financial support. However, it is also possible that judges merely 
exhibit a subconscious bias where they subtly respond more favorably to those who 
supported their campaign efforts without intentionally attempting to reward them. While 
it would be difficult to discern whether judges intentionally issue biased decisions, in 
either case there is a potential for judges to be influenced by their campaign contributions 
to lean towards certain parties instead of objectively and impartially weighing all of the 
facts of each case.  
	   16 
However, it could also be the case that judges rule in favor of lawyers who 
contributed to their campaigns for reasons other than their contributions. It is possible 
that the lawyers who donate to judges’ campaigns are able to do so because their firms 
tend to represent wealthier clients and as a result have more financial resources. Having 
larger amounts of capital could provide these lawyers with better litigation resources, 
providing them with an advantage in court that would make judges more likely to vote in 
their favor. Additionally, lawyers could display a tendency to support judicial candidates 
who are ideologically more inclined to support the types of litigants they tend to 
represent. For example, a law firm that generally represents defendants in criminal trials 
could contribute to a liberal leaning judge, under the assumption that he or she would be 
more likely to favor criminal defendants. If the judge later voted in favor of that law firm, 
it may be due to a natural ideological inclination instead of a response to the firm’s 
financial support. In order to analyze the effect of contributions on judicial behavior, it is 
important to separate the effects of donations from firms’ advantages and judges’ 
ideological leanings. By classifying litigants into ranked classifications following the 
underdog method of Songer and Sheehan (1992), these factors can better be controlled in 
order to isolate the effects of campaign contributions. 
It is also possible that judges will display biased behavior towards lawyers not 
only when those lawyers individually contribute to judges’ campaigns, but when anyone 
from the lawyers’ law firms contributes as well. For example, if one lawyer makes a 
sizable donation to a judge’s campaign, the judge might consider the donation to 
represent support from both that lawyer and the law firm that he or she represents. If 
other lawyers from that firm who did not personally contribute the judge’s campaign later 
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appear before the judge, it is possible that the judge will still display some amount of bias 
in their favor because of the donations associated with their firm. Therefore, I predict that 
donations from both the individual lawyers arguing a case before recently elected judges 
and other parties from their law firms are likely to have an influence on judges’ behavior. 
It is also important to note that if contributions to judges’ campaigns have an 
influence on judicial decision making, the effect of a contribution is likely to be strongest 
immediately following the judge’s election. As the time since a judge’s election 
increases, the amount that individual lawyers and firms contributed to his or her election 
campaign is likely to become less prominent in the judge’s mind. As a result, judges are 
less likely to display favorable behavior based on contributions over time and judges 
elected in different years are likely to show different degrees of biases in their decisions. 
In order to account for the possible influence of time diminishing the importance of 
contributions on decisions, I will only take into account judges’ decisions in the two 
years following their election. 
Additionally, it is possible that the value of marginally increasing a lawyer’s 
campaign contribution varies by the nominal amount of his or her contribution. 
Increasing one’s donation by a set nominal amount does not seem as significant when the 
size of the original donation was already large. For example, increasing one’s 
contribution from $50 to $150 is likely to have a greater influence on judges’ voting 
patterns than increasing one’s contribution from $1000 to $1100 because it appears to be 
a greater increase, even though both are nominal $100 increases. This is because the $100 
increases the $50 contribution by 200 percent, while the same $100 increases the $1000 
contribution by only 10 percent. Because providing a greater contribution is not likely to 
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have a consistent influence on judges’ decisions across different contribution amounts 
and large contribution amounts are likely to skew the results, I will use the log 
transformation of the amount that lawyers contribute to judges’ campaigns rather than 
nominal amount of their contributions. A log transformation will adjust the scale of 
contribution amounts to account for outliers and more effectively model the data. 
The possibility of large campaign contributions influencing judges’ decisions is 
likely to have the most severe implications in the context of state supreme courts. The 
decisions of state supreme courts can only be appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court when 
the cases involve federal law, and even then the Supreme Court actually decides only a 
small proportion of the appeals it receives each year (Hall 2015). As a result, the 
decisions of state supreme courts are rarely subjected to further review. This suggests that 
if state judges make decisions that are biased by campaign donations, these decisions will 
likely have lasting implications for the parties involved and could permanently hinder 
their ability to receive an impartial ruling. In order to ensure the integrity of states’ 
judicial systems and protect individuals’ ability to receive a fair trial it is necessary to 
more closely examine the implications of judicial elections in state supreme courts, so my 
study will focus on the relationship between contributions and decisions in the Supreme 
Court of North Carolina. 
Because of the growing controversy surrounding judicial elections and the 
potential that they create for judicial biases, some states have enacted campaign financing 
reforms to provide public funding for candidates and regulate private donations. In 2002 
North Carolina enacted the Judicial Campaign Reform Act, which provided public 
campaign funding for candidates on the ballot for the Court of Appeals and Supreme 
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Court of North Carolina from 2004 until it was repealed in 2013. Participation in the 
program was optional, but candidates were required to receive donations from at least 
350 registered voters and to reach a set threshold of qualifying contributions in order to 
receive state funds. The bill also established $1000 contribution limits for all judicial 
campaigns and created spending restrictions for the candidates receiving state funds 
(Judicial Campaign Reform Act 2002). Candidates for the Supreme Court who met the 
criteria for receiving state funding and chose to opt into the program generally received 
more than $200,000 from the state to fund their campaign (Goldberg et al 2004). 
 Although North Carolina’s public funding program was designed to increase the 
independence of the judiciary, there remained at least a potential for bias under the 
program because it still required candidates to privately solicit a threshold level of funds 
in order to receive public funding. By not completely eliminating private campaign 
contributions, the program left open the possibility that lawyers and law firms would 
provide the required donations and that biased judicial decisions would still result. 
However, it is likely that participation in this type of program would reduce the 
likelihood of any causal relationship between campaign contributions and decisions. If 
judges were not pressured to raise substantial campaign funds in order to be elected, they 
would be less dependent on their contributors in order to be elected and therefore less 
likely to at least consciously reward them for their political support through biased 
rulings. Additionally, by limiting the amount of money candidates are allowed to raise, 
these programs could also reduce the opportunities for bias because the restrictions would 
prevent lawyers from providing significant contribution amounts.  
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Methodology and Data 
In order to empirically study whether campaign contributions from lawyers and 
law firms encourage biases in judges’ decision making, I examined the 2006 elections of 
the North Carolina Supreme Court. The year 2006 was selected because four of the seven 
seats on the court were up for election. North Carolina Supreme Court judges are elected 
on a rotating basis to serve an eight year term and typically only one or two judges face 
the electorate at a time, so an election including four seats offers a greater than average 
quantity of candidate data. Additionally, the four judges who were elected in 2006 had a 
variety of experience on the court. Two of the judges were incumbents who were 
reelected, one was elected for his first term, and one was elected to retain her seat after 
being appointed by the governor to fill a vacancy. The diversity of the judges’ 
experiences incorporates a variety of political circumstances into the data, which 
increases the generalizability of the results. The 2006 elections were also significant 
because they fell under the period of North Carolina’s public financing program for 
judicial elections. Three of the four judges elected in 2006 participated in the state’s 
financing program (Democracy North Carolina 2010), so the data allows the effects of 
campaign contributions to be examined within the context of both privately funded and 
publicly funded campaigns. 
  To study the effects of the 2006 election, I obtained the 2007 and 2008 NC 
Supreme Court opinions from the North Carolina Court System. Using these opinions, I 
created a dataset that included the names of the lawyers that represented each litigant in 
all of the cases. The majority of the Court’s opinions included the names of each lawyer’s 
law firm as well, so the firm names were also coded into the dataset. However, not all of 
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the opinions specified the names of the law firms that the lawyers represented, so it is 
possible that there were additional firms involved that are unrepresented in the dataset. 
Whether each judge voted in favor of the petitioner or the respondent was also obtained 
from the Court’s opinions and coded into the dataset. The cases where it was unclear how 
the judges voted were not included in the dataset. The opinions from 2006 were also 
excluded in order to prevent any confounding influences from the election campaigns and 
fundraising efforts of the judges running for reelection that year. Over the two year 
period, there were 154 usable cases that were included in the data. 
Campaign contribution data was obtained for each of the judges elected in 2006 
from the North Carolina State Board of Elections. This data contains the names, 
occupations, and employers of each individual that contributed to the judges’ election 
campaigns as well as the amount that each individual donated. The number of 
contributions made to each judge’s campaign varied between judges, ranging from less 
than 400 contributions to more than 1,400 contributions. This variation can partly be 
explained by participation in the state’s public financing program, as the one judge who 
did not participate in the program and raised all of his donations privately had the largest 
number of contributors. Additionally, nearly 30 percent of the total contributors of all 
four judges’ campaigns listed their occupation as “lawyer” or “attorney.” The number of 
lawyers who contributed to the judges’ campaigns is likely to be even higher in reality, as 
many contributions were listed on the Board of Elections documents as an “aggregated 
individual contribution” for which no information was provided about the identity of the 
contributors. Many of the contributors defined their occupations as “unemployed” or 
“self-employed” as well, either of which could also include lawyers. 
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To create the central dataset used in my study, I matched the names of the lawyers 
and law firms who argued each case with the names of the individuals and employers 
who contributed to the judges’ campaigns. By merging the campaign contributions 
dataset with the judicial decisions dataset, I created a dataset that shows whether each 
judge voted in favor of the petitioner and how much money each judge received from the 
lawyers and law firms on each side of the case. From this, I created variables for both the 
petitioners and respondents that measure whether the party’s lawyer (or that lawyer’s 
firm) contributed any amount of money to the judge’s election campaign. I also created 
comparable variables that reflect the actual dollar amounts of lawyer and firm 
contributions. In order to normalize the effect of extreme values in the distribution of 
these contributions, I used a log transformation for these variables. Additionally, I created 
a variable that represented whether or not each judge voted in favor of the petitioner in 
each of the cases argued before him or her. 
To control for certain types of parties having advantages in their financial and 
litigation resources and for judges’ ideological tendencies to lean towards specific types 
of litigants, I replicated Songer and Sheehan’s “underdog” approach (1992). I modified 
the classification system that they used to rank the relative advantages of each party in 
order to better accommodate the types of parties that frequently appear in state court 
cases. From the least advantaged to the most advantaged, the categories that I used to 
classify litigants were: criminal defendants, individuals, businesses, local governments, 
county governments, city governments, state government agencies, and the state 
government. Each of these categories was assigned a number from 1 to 8 and each 
litigant was classified as one of these numbers. From these rankings, I created a variable 
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that represented the ranking of the petitioner subtracted by the ranking of the respondent. 
Positive values of the variable reveal that the petitioner is likely to be the relatively 
advantaged party while negative values suggest that the respondent is likely to be more 
advantaged. This variable serves as a control variable to reinforce the influence of 
donations on judges’ vote by showing donations were not associated with a confounding 
factor like some law firms having greater financial or litigation resources. 
 
Results and Analysis 
  Even though the state offered a public campaign financing program that judicial 
candidates could opt into in 2006, many of the judges who were elected to the North 
Carolina Supreme Court that year still raised large proportions of their campaign funds 
privately (Figure 1). Justice Parker’s campaign had the largest amount of total funds at 
$445,059.55, and although she received state funding she raised more than 75 percent of 
her campaign funds privately. Justice Martin had the smallest amount of campaign 
funding at $226,344.06, which can largely be attributed to his failure to opt into the 
public financing program. All of the judges had median private contributions of $100, 
except for Justice Timmons-Goodson whose median contribution was $50. None of the 
judges received contributions over the $1000 limit established in the Judicial Campaign 
Reform Act, although it is unclear whether judges would have received larger amounts 
from individual contributors if the act were not in place. 
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The data also revealed that lawyers contributed a significant amount of judges’ 
private campaign funds (Figure 2). For three of the four judges elected in 2006, 
contributors who listed their occupation as “lawyer” or “attorney” provided more than 30 
percent of the judges’ private contributions. Notably, lawyers contributed 64 percent of 
Justice Hudson’s private funding and gave a nominal amount of more than $99,000 to 
Justice Martin’s campaign. The amount of campaign funding provided by lawyers 
suggests that they play a significant role in judges’ election efforts. Because this data 
suggests that judges are to some extent dependent on lawyers for their extensive financial 
support, it is possible that judges will face pressure to show favoritism towards lawyers in 
order to reward them for their support.   
$50,714.53 
$226,344.06 
$344,634.90 
$83,534.95 
$211,050.00 
$0.00 
$100,424.65 
$211,050.00 
0 
50000 
100000 
150000 
200000 
250000 
300000 
350000 
400000 
450000 
500000 
Hudson Martin Parker Timmons-Goodson 
Sources of Campaign Funding (2006) 
Public Funds Private Contributions 
Figure 1 
	   25 
 
 
The data also reveals that there is often an opportunity for judges to reward their 
contributors, as many of the lawyers who contributed to judges’ election campaigns later 
argued cases in front of them (Table 1). For Justice Hudson and Justice Parker, more than 
30 percent of the cases argued before them in 2007 and 2008 included at least one litigant 
whose lawyer or firm donated to their election campaign. While the percentage of cases 
where the counsel of at least one litigant contributed was lower for Justice Martin and 
Justice Timmons-Goodson, the petitioner still contributed to Justice Martin’s campaign in 
more than 10 percent of the cases and to Justice Timmons-Goodson’s campaign in more 
than 8 percent of cases. These findings are important because they reveal that there is an 
opportunity for judges to show favoritism towards one side in many of the cases argued 
before them, which suggests that it is at least possible that judicial elections have harmful 
implications for judicial independence.  
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Table 1                           Contributions from Litigants’ Counsel (2006) 
Justice 
Percent of Rulings 
in Favor of 
Petitioner 
Percent of Cases 
Plaintiff’s Counsel 
Contributed 
Percent of Cases 
Respondent’s 
Counsel 
Contributed 
Hudson 41.18 24.84 30.72 
Martin 40.13 10.53 6.58 
Parker 39.47 30.92 34.87 
Timmons-
Goodson 
37.5 8.33 1.39 
 
In order to analyze the relationship between lawyers’ campaign contributions and 
judges’ decisions, I first used a difference of proportions test. Using only the votes of the 
judges who were elected in 2006, the test compared the proportion of judges’ votes that 
were in favor of the petitioner based on whether the petitioner’s lawyer or law firm 
contributed to their campaigns (Table 2). The results showed that judges were 
significantly more likely to vote in favor of the petitioner when the petitioner’s counsel 
contributed than they were if the petitioner’s counsel did not contribute. I also ran a 
difference of proportions test that compared judges’ votes for the petitioner based on 
whether the respondent’s counsel did or did not contribute (Table 3). In this test, judges 
were significantly less likely to vote in favor of the petitioner when the respondent’s 
counsel contributed to their campaign. Because there was a significant difference in 
judges’ voting behavior in both tests based on whether the litigants’ counsel contributed 
to the judges’ campaigns, the results suggest that lawyers’ campaign contributions do 
have an influence on judges’ votes. 
Table 2     Judges’ Votes by Petitioners’ Contributions 
 Petitioner’s 
Counsel 
Contributed 
Petitioner’s 
Counsel Did Not 
Contribute 
Proportion of 
Votes in Favor 
of Petitioner 
64.6 33.8 
Note: The results were significant at the p < .01 level.  
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Table 3     Judges’ Votes by Respondents’ Contributions 
 Respondent’s 
Counsel 
Contributed 
Respondent’s 
Counsel Did Not 
Contribute 
Proportion of 
Votes in Favor 
of Petitioner 
30.4 41.7 
Note: The results were significant at the p < .05 level. 
 
 I then used a regression to study the correlation between campaign contributions 
and judges’ votes. Because the dependent variable, whether or not each judge voted in 
favor of the petitioner, is a binary variable, I used a probit regression. For the independent 
variables I used dummy variables representing whether or not the litigants’ counsel on 
each side contributed any amount of money to judges’ campaigns (Table 4, 1). The 
results revealed that there was a significant and positive relationship between a lawyer or 
the lawyer’s firm donating any amount of money to a judge’s election campaign and the 
judge then ruling in favor of that lawyer’s client.  
I also ran a similar regression where the independent variables were instead the 
log transformations of the amounts of contributions provided by the lawyers and firms 
(Table 4, 2). The results for this regression also showed a significant relationship between 
contributions and decisions, suggesting that the amount of money that lawyers contribute 
has an impact on whether judges vote in their favor. The positive coefficient for the 
petitioners’ donations revealed that as the petitioner’s counsel contributed larger amounts 
of money to a judge’s campaign, the judge was more likely to rule in his or her favor. 
Similarly, the negative coefficient for the respondent’s contributions revealed that as the 
respondent’s counsel contributed more it decreased the probability that the judge would 
rule in favor of the petitioner. Because there was a significant relationship between the 
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variables representing lawyers’ contributions and judges’ votes, both when contributions 
were represented as a dummy variable and as a log transformation of the contribution 
amount, the results provide further evidence that lawyers’ campaign contributions impact 
judges’ decision making. 
 
Table 4      Counsels’ Campaign Contributions and Judges’ Votes 
 (1) (2) 
Did Petitioner’s  
Lawyer Donate 
 
.776 * (.156) - 
Did Respondent’s  
Lawyer Donate 
 
-.252* (.078) - 
Log of Contribution by  
Petitioner’s Lawyer 
 
- .114* (.027) 
Log of Contribution by 
Respondent’s Lawyer 
 
- -.038* (.015) 
Constant -.369 (.038) -.367 (.038) 
Number of Observations 
 
601 601 
Pseudo R2 .048 .046 
Note: Robust Standard Error in parentheses.  
*P < .01 or better 
 
However, the difference of proportions tests and regressions described above do 
not establish causality because they do not control for any confounding factors that may 
also influence judges’ voting behaviors. As a result, I performed the same regression and 
included the variable that controls for the difference in relative advantages that are likely 
to be inherent across different types of litigants (Table 5, 1). The control variable was 
found to be significant, suggesting that a judge is more likely to rule in favor of the 
petitioner when the petitioner is classified into a relatively more advantaged category 
than the respondent. However, the variable representing the contributions from the 
respondent’s counsel displayed a positive coefficient, which implies that judges were 
more likely to vote in favor of the petitioner when the respondent’s counsel donated 
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money. This contradicts the theory that donating to a judge’s campaign causes a bias in 
the contributor’s favor, as it shows contributions actually harming contributors. Because 
a positive relationship between respondents’ donations and judges’ votes for the 
petitioner was not observed until the control variable was included in the model, the 
results suggest that including litigants’ differences in rank without any constraints has an 
unintended effect on the data. 
 
Table 5     Judges’ Votes and Counsels’ Contributions, Controlling for Litigants’  
                 Advantages 
 (1) (2) 
Log of Contribution by Petitioner’s  
Lawyer 
 
.06* (.004) .139* (.033) 
Log of Contribution by Respondent’s  
Lawyer 
.035* (.014) -.051* (.008) 
Difference in Litigants’ Relative Ranking 
 
Constant 
 
Number of Observations 
 
Pseudo R2 
.097* (.008) 
 
-.344 (.008) 
 
601 
 
.116 
- 
 
-.447 (.082) 
 
394 
 
.078 
Note: Robust Standard Error in parentheses. 
*P < .01 or better 
(2) only includes cases where Difference in Litigants’ Relative Ranking  < -2 or > 2. 
 
In order to gain a better understanding of the control variable representing 
litigants’ relative advantages and its interactions with the other variables in the model, I 
ran the previous regression again while adding constraints on the control variable (Table 
5, 2). I set the model to only include cases where the litigants on either side were not 
classified into the same categories or into closely ranked categories so that there was a 
larger difference in the litigants’ relative advantages. By narrowing the sample to only 
include cases with large differences in litigants’ advantages, the model is able to examine 
the effect of one party having genuine advantages over the other with greater clarity. For 
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example, if two litigants are classified into consecutively ranked categories, they may be 
similar enough that there are not actually any distinctions between their advantages even 
though their different rankings would suggest that there were. Adding a constraint on the 
differences in litigants’ ranking allows the variable to more closely represent actual and 
significant variations in litigants’ advantages. With these restraints on the control 
variable, the results met the theoretical expectations. The petitioners’ donations showed a 
significant and positive relationship with judge’s votes in favor of the petitioner, and the 
respondents’ donations showed a significant and negative relationship with judges’ votes 
for the petitioner. Because the control variable attempts to account for judges’ ideology 
and litigants’ inherent advantages, these results expand on earlier findings and more 
strongly suggest that judges’ votes in favor of their contributors are actually the result of 
lawyers’ contributions and not confounding factors. 
To better understand the impact that lawyers’ contributions have on judges’ 
decisions, I also estimated the predicted probabilities of judge voting in favor of the 
petitioner at different values of lawyers’ contributions. As a whole, the four judges 
elected in 2006 voted in favor of the petitioner in 39.6 percent of the cases argued before 
them in 2007 and 2008. When the lawyer or firm representing the petitioner contributed 
$100 to a judge’s campaign, the predicted probability of the judge voting in the 
petitioner’s favor was 40.28 percent. When the petitioner’s counsel contributed $500, the 
predicted probability rose to 44.03 percent. Although the predicted probabilities do not 
reveal drastic increases in the judges’ expected behavior based on lawyers’ contributions, 
they do suggest that financial support from lawyers and law firms is likely to bias judges’ 
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rulings in favor of their clients. This further indicates that judicial elections may have 
harmful implications for judicial independence and the impartiality of state judges. 
In order to examine the ability of the state’s public financing program to reduce 
judicial biases based on campaign contributions, I first ran a difference of proportions test 
that only included the three judges who participated in the public financing program. The 
test examined the difference in judges’ votes for the petitioner based on whether or not 
they received contributions from the petitioner’s counsel (Table 6). The test revealed that 
there was a significant difference in the judges’ votes based on whether the litigants’ 
counsel contributed to their campaigns, and that the judges were significantly more likely 
to vote in favor of the petitioner if the petitioner’s counsel donated to their campaign. 
This suggests that even though the judges received state campaign funding and were 
therefore not entirely dependent upon private donations to fund their campaigns, they 
were still influenced by the private contributions they did receive and displayed 
preferential treatment towards their contributors.  
In comparison, I ran the same difference of proportions test using only the judge 
who did not opt into the public funding program that year (Table 6). This test did not 
reveal a significant difference in the judge’s votes based on whether the litigants’ counsel 
contributed to his election campaign. These results make it questionable whether public 
funding programs reduce the probability of judicial biases, as the judge who did not 
partake in the funding program displayed the lowest level of favoritism towards his 
campaign contributors, despite being the only judge that was entirely reliant on private 
donations. 
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Table 6      Judges’ Votes by Participation in Public Campaign  
                  Financing Program 
 Petitioner’s 
Counsel 
Contributed 
Petitioner’s 
Counsel Did 
Not Contribute 
Proportion of Votes in Favor 
of Petitioner For Judges in 
Public Funding Program 
65.98* 32.1* 
 
Proportion of Votes in Favor 
of Petitioner For Judge Not in 
Public Funding Program 
56.3 38.2 
*The difference in proportions was significant at the p < .01 level.  
 
 I also performed a regression to examine the correlation between campaign 
contributions and judges’ decisions including only the three justices who opted into the 
state’s public financing program (Table 7, 1). I used the log transformation of each 
counsels’ campaign contributions as the independent variables, the judges’ votes as the 
dependent variable, and controlled for the differences in the litigants’ relative advantages. 
The regression showed that there was a positive correlation between lawyers and firms’ 
contributions and judges’ decisions. The positive coefficient for the petitioners’ 
contributions reveals that as the petitioners’ counsels donate more money, judges are 
more likely to rule in favor of the petitioner. The negative coefficient for the respondents’ 
contributions suggests that as the respondents’ counsels donate more money, judges are 
less likely to rule in favor of the petitioner. Although the judges included in this 
regression received state funding for their election campaigns and were theoretically less 
likely to be dependent on private contributors, campaign contributions were still found to 
have a significant influence on their voting patterns. 
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Table 7    Judges’ Votes and Counsels’ Campaign Contributions by Participation in  
                 Public Financing Campaign 
 (1) (2) 
Log of Contribution by Petitioner’s Lawyer .139* (.024) .017* (.064) 
Log of Contribution by Respondent’s Lawyer -.049* (.024) .068* (.086)  
Constant -.4 (.085) -.379 (.135) 
Number of Observations 396 101 
Pseudo R2 .0796 .008 
Note: Robust Standard Error in parentheses. 
*P < .05 or better 
(2) only includes cases where Difference in Litigants’ Relative Ranking > -2 or < 2. 
 
 In comparison, I ran an identical regression using the only judge elected in 2006 
who did not opt into the state’s public financing program (Table 7, 2). Contrary to what 
was expected, neither contributions from the petitioners’ lawyers nor the respondents’ 
lawyers had a significant influence on the judge’s votes, even though the judge was 
entirely dependent on private donations. These findings indicate that although the state’s 
campaign funding program was theoretically likely to reduce judges’ dependence on 
private donations and therefore decrease their likelihood of biased decision making, in 
actuality participation in the state’s program did not appear to eliminate the judges’ 
biases in favor of their contributors. 
 
Conclusion  
 In conclusion, this study has explored the relationship between judges’ election 
campaign contributions and their voting patterns once on the bench. The findings suggest 
that there is a relationship between the amount that lawyers and law firms donated to 
North Carolina Supreme Court judges’ election campaigns and judges’ decisions. 
Because judges were more likely to rule in favor of litigants when their counsel donated 
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to the judges’ campaigns even after controlling for the relative advantages of litigants, the 
findings suggest that campaign contributions could to some extent create biases in 
judicial decision making. Additionally, this research began to delve into the topic of 
public financing programs for judicial elections and found no evidence that receiving 
public funding from the state reduced the likelihood that judges displayed favoritism 
towards their contributors.  
 As this study finds evidence that campaign contributions could hinder judges’ 
impartiality and independence, it reveals a need for further exploration of the topic of 
judicial elections. Although the results indicate that there is a positive correlation 
between campaign contributions and judges’ decisions, it fails to fully establish a causal 
relationship. Future studies could further these findings by including additional controls 
such as more direct measures of judges’ ideology in order to better indicate a causal 
relationship between contributions and decisions. It would also be beneficial for future 
research to examine the impact of public funding programs in additional states where the 
requirements and restrictions vary in order to better understand the potential for campaign 
reform programs to reduce judicial biases. 
 Furthermore, this study is limited in that it only offers a critique of one method of 
judicial selection. Although this study suggests that judicial elections can restrict judicial 
independence by making judges reliant upon their campaign contributors, past research 
indicates that other selection methods can also be problematic for judicial independence. 
As a result, while judicial elections may create a system that encourages biases in judges’ 
decision making, it is unclear whether there is a more optimal alternative. Future research 
should explore judicial elections relative to other methods of judicial selection in order to 
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offer more comprehensive policy making suggestions about selecting judges in the way 
that is the least harmful for judicial independence.  
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